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ABSTRACT
There is no statutory framework to protect the property interests of unmarried cohabitants in Malaysia at the present 
time. Many couples engaged in unmarried cohabitation encounter issues relating to the division of property when a 
relationship breaks down, for example, because of separation or death. A cohabitant who has contributed to a lesser 
financial degree, but who has made significant non-financial contributions is often economically disadvantaged when the 
relationship ends. Whilst the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 applies to married couples in the division 
of matrimonial property that takes into account both financial and non-financial contributions, this statutory right is not 
extended to unmarried cohabitants. For cohabitants, the common law principles of resulting and constructive trusts apply. 
The courts adopt a “functional approach” in recognising the relationship and the manner of dividing the property. Even 
though case law recognises unmarried cohabitation and their rights to the division of property, a statutory recognition 
is essential to provide a clearer guideline that would encourage consistent judicial outcome. This would protect the 
interests of unmarried cohabitants in Malaysia.
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ABSTRAK
Di Malaysia, pada masa kini tiada rang undang-undang yang diperuntukkan untuk melindungi hak tuntutan terhadap 
harta pasangan yang bersekedudukan tanpa nikah. Ramai pasangan yang menjalani kehidupan bersekedudukan tanpa 
nikah berhadapan dengan isu berkaitan pembahagian harta apabila hubungan mereka tamat; contohnya apabila berlaku 
perpisahan atau kematian. Selain itu, dalam hubungan ini, seorang pasangan yang hanya memberi sedikit sumbangan 
kewangan manakala memberi banyak sumbangan dalam bentuk bukan kewangan akan mengalami kerugian dari aspek 
ekonomi apabila hubungan mereka tamat. Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Parkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976 
diguna pakai untuk pasangan yang telah berkahwin dalam pembahagian harta sepencarian mereka dan kedua-dua 
sumbangan kewangan dan bukan kewangan diambil kira. Walaubagaimanapun, perlindungan dari segi perundangan 
tidak diperuntukkan kepada pasangan yang bersekedudukan tanpa nikah. Untuk pasangan yang bersekedudukan ini, 
prinsip “common law” seperti amanah konstruktif and amanah berbangkit diguna pakai. Mahkamah menerimapakai 
“pendekatan fungsian” untuk mengiktiraf hubungan pasangan bersekedudukan dan hak mereka terhadap pembahagian 
harta sepencarian. Walaupun begitu, pengiktirafan dari segi perundangan adalah penting dan akan memberi garis 
panduan yang lebih jelas. Hal ini turut menggalakkan keputusan mahkamah yang konsisten. Keseluruhannya, ini mampu 
melindugi hak pasangan bersekedudukan tanpa nikah.
Kata kunci: Bersekedudukan; hubungan; sumbangan; harta; amanah
INTRODUCTION
To begin with an overview of the Malaysian legal system, 
it is divided into Sharia and Civil jurisdictions.1 The 
Sharia laws only apply over Muslims on (1) personal law 
matters (such as marriage and divorce), child custody, 
maintenance and matrimonial property divisions, and 
(2) Islamic criminal offences, for instance, unmarried 
sexual relationships, homosexuality, indecent dressing, 
and other Islamic criminal offences. Subsequently, the 
Sharia court only confers its powers over Muslims. 
The non-Muslims, on the other hand, are administered 
within the Civil law and courts. The Civil courts should 
not extend their power over Muslims or matters that fall 
within the Sharia courts.
For the purposes of discussion within this paper, 
property could be divided into relationship property 
and separate property. The term ‘relationship property’ 
is used for the context of unmarried cohabitants rather 
than ‘matrimonial property.’ However, the aspects of 
matrimonial property are commonly discussed to describe 
the legal position of married couples to property matters. 
The Statutes in Malaysia are silent on the definition of 
‘matrimonial property’ (harta sepencarian). Generally, 
the term ‘matrimonial property’ describes the property 
acquired during the subsistence of marriage.2 In the case 
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of Ching Seng Woah v Lim Shook Lin,3 Shankar J refers 
‘matrimonial property’ to:
“… the expressions refer to the matrimonial home and 
everything which is put into it by either spouse with the intention 
that their home and chattels should be a continuing resource for 
the spouses and their children to be used jointly and severally 
for the benefit of the family as a whole. It matters not in this 
context whether the asset is acquired solely by the one party or 
the other or by their joint efforts. Whilst the marriage subsists, 
these assets are matrimonial assets. Such assets could be capital 
assets. The earning power of each spouse is also an asset.”
Referring to the above case, ‘matrimonial property’ 
is given a wide definition in the court of law. It clearly 
indicates that any property acquired by both or either 
spouse during the marriage is considered matrimonial 
property, in addition to the earning capacity of the each 
spouse. The spouses’ paid income out of employment is 
considered matrimonial property. Formerly, matrimonial 
property included houses and animals used to work the 
land, and recently it has developed to include moveable 
and immoveable property, such as the household 
goods and furnishings, in line with the lifestyle and the 
purchasing power of society.4 It also incorporates joint 
bank accounts, compensation paid for land acquired by 
the Government,5 shares registered in the name of either 
spouse,6 and the business assets acquired during the 
subsistence of marriage.7 Discussion on separate property 
is not covered within this article.
MARRIED COUPLES’ POSITION ON THE 
DIVISION OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
For the context of married couples, generally, both the 
Sharia and Civil courts implement wide discretionary 
powers to divide the matrimonial property in the divorce 
petition. “The main test applied by both courts in deciding 
rights and proportion for the divorced parties is the 
‘contribution test,’ whereby if both parties contribute 
to the acquisition of the property, subsequently, each 
of the parties shall have rights over the property.”8 For 
example, if a couple to a Muslim or non-Muslim marriage 
have made financial contributions in the acquisition of 
the matrimonial home, by way of a half share each, in 
the event of a marriage breakdown, the court would 
probably divide the property in equal shares.9 In this 
matter, an equality of property division is apparent 
when both spouses to the marriage have made ‘financial 
contributions’ in the acquisition of the matrimonial 
property.
‘Financial contributions’ for the purposes of 
dividing the matrimonial property could be outlined as 
the contributions made by each party towards acquiring 
those assets, in the form of (1) money, (2) property, or (3) 
labour.10 The term ‘money’ implies the direct financial 
contribution in purchasing the matrimonial home. In the 
example above, if each party to a marriage contributes 
50 per cent to the total amount of the house purchase 
price (matrimonial home), then both have clearly made 
direct financial contributions. Second, the term ‘property’ 
implies the income generated from any property belonging 
to either spouse, as in the form of rent, or proceeds out 
of the sale of the property, which is then used towards 
acquiring matrimonial assets. Third, ‘labour,’ includes 
the income from paid employment, which is then used 
to buy the matrimonial property. Hereafter, ‘financial 
contribution’ includes the contributions in the form of 
money, property and/or labour.
For the second example, there is also a circumstance 
when the parties to the marriage have both made financial 
contributions in the acquisition of the property, however 
they contribute in different amounts. For example one 
partner contributes 70 per cent of the purchase price 
of the matrimonial home, while the other spouse only 
contributes 30 per cent. In this situation, the court 
could still place equal importance on their monetary 
contributions, regardless of the differences in the amount 
contributed.11 On that basis, the court could order equal 
rights over the matrimonial property, by way of an equal 
division for each spouse. Notwithstanding that, this matter 
is conditional upon the court’s wide discretionary order 
as such, or otherwise.12 The Islamic Family Law (Federal 
Territories) Act 1984 (IFLFT 1984) mentions that the court 
has the power to make an order while having regard to 
the extent of contributions made by the party who did 
not acquire the assets, but contributed to the welfare of 
the family by looking after the home and caring for the 
family.13 In taking into account the welfare of looking 
after the family and home, the court may divide the assets 
or the proceeds of the sale in the proportions as the court 
thinks reasonable, but in any case, the party by whose 
efforts the assets were acquired, shall receive a greater 
proportion than the party who did not make any financial 
contribution. The term ‘greater’ is wide in context, and 
the court has all the power to determine and quantify 
how much of the property share is ‘greater’ and give 
orders for the party who made financial contribution in 
the acquisition of the matrimonial property.14
Based on the illustrations above, it can be viewed 
that both Sharia and Civil courts have wide discretionary 
power to order the division of matrimonial assets.15 The 
court could exercise its wide power to focus on (1) equal 
financial contribution by both spouses in the marriage and 
order equal division of property (the spouses contributing 
50 per cent each, and thus the court orders 50 per cent 
of the matrimonial property) to both, or (2) the court 
accepts unequal monetary contribution, but orders an 
equal property division (one partner contributes 70 per 
cent and the other paying the balance 30 per cent, but 
the court orders 50 per cent of property division for each 
spouse).
The court’s extensive flexibility is supported by 
the broad provision in the applicable Acts.16 The related 
provisions in these Acts assure the court’s power to 
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consider the financial contributions of spouses within 
the marriage relationship. In this matter, the court shall 
take into account the extent of contributions made by 
each party (in the form of money, property and/or labour) 
towards acquiring the matrimonial property, and subject 
to those considerations, the court shall incline towards 
an equality of division.17 With respect to this matter, 
the court has an extensive power to determine (1) what 
could be accepted as ‘contributions,’ and (2) whether 
the courts’ orders reflect the principle of equality in the 
property divisions.
Besides that, in the event where the matrimonial 
property is acquired by the sole effort of one of the parties 
to the marriage relationship, an equality of division is 
not present.18 For example, the applicable Acts19 mention 
that the party who acquired the property by his or her 
sole effort shall receive a greater share in the division 
of the assets. Nonetheless, the spouse who does not 
contribute at all in the acquisition of the property could 
still receive a lesser share allocation out of the property, 
provided that this party has made some contribution to 
the welfare of the family, by taking care of the family and 
children (non-financial contributions). The provisions in 
the mentioned Acts generally state ‘greater share,’ and do 
not direct the court on how to determine which amount 
is greater and how to make an order which represents a 
‘greater’ allocation.20 With limited guidance, the courts’ 
orders vary.
On the other hand, for unmarried cohabitants (non-
Muslims), the equitable principles of constructive trusts 
apply.21 The following section examines this further. 
The relationship property is divided between the parties 
in accordance with their financial contributions in the 
acquisition of the relationship property. The parties who 
do not make any financial contribution in the acquisition 
of the property, largely possess no legal rights to property 
entitlements.
PROPERTY DIVISION OF UNMARRIED 
COHABITANTS
DEFINITION OF UNMARRIED COHABITATION
Couples’ relationships are treated differently in every part 
of the world. Some countries only recognise the ‘status’ 
of couples, as in the married relationship, while several 
other countries recognise the ‘function’ performed by 
cohabitants in their relationship. Marriage is a state-
endorsed form of status given to married couples, while 
cohabitation is merely recognised on the basis of function 
without any legal endorsement to the relationship. 
Therefore, cohabitants could be addressed as unmarried 
partners who live together as a couple, but not in a state 
recognised relationship. The ‘function’ for the context 
of this article is mostly to describe the performance 
of household duties and care and support of children, 
property acquisition by both partners and their financial 
interdependence with each other, the existence of a 
sexual relationship, the duration and common residence 
of the partners and the commitment to a shared life. In 
Malaysia however, unmarried cohabitants are not legally 
recognised of their relationship. This article nevertheless 
argues that cohabitants function the same way as married 
couples, and subsequently should be recognised of their 
relationship and be given legal rights, specifically on 
the division of the ‘relationship property.’ ‘Relationship 
property’ for the purposes of this paper could be defined 
as the property acquired by both partners during the 
course of their cohabiting relationship.
Unmarried cohabitation in Malaysia can be divided 
into three categories; (1) cohabitation among the 
Muslims; (2) cohabitation among the non-Muslims; and 
(3) cohabitation among inter-religious couples (a Muslim 
with a non-Muslim).
COHABITATION AMONG MUSLIMS
Even before considering the rights to property, it should be 
noted that unmarried cohabitation is an Islamic criminal 
offence. Muslim couples rarely admit their act of living 
together because they could be found guilty and imposed 
with criminal sanctions. They could be punished with 
imprisonment, a fine and/or whip. The punishments are 
in accordance with the Islamic statutes that vary among 
the 13 states in Malaysia.
Under the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal 
Territories) Act 1997, any man who performs sexual 
intercourse with a woman who is not his lawful wife shall 
be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to a fine not 
exceeding five thousand ‘ringgit,’ imprisonment to a term 
not exceeding three years, whipping not exceeding six 
strokes or to any combination thereof.22 There are several 
cases in Malaysia involving cohabitation among Muslims, 
and the punishment ordered differs among the cases. In 
the case of Pendakwa Syarie Negeri Sabah lwn Rosli 
bin Abdul Japar, the accused, Rosli bin Abdul Japar was 
charged with committing sexual conduct out of wedlock 
with Ms. Murni binti Muhammad, until the birth of their 
son, named Hasmawi bin. Abdullah. Therefore, Rosli 
was ordered to pay a fine of RM3,000.00, or six months 
imprisonment, if he failed to pay the fine.
The same punishments apply to women if they 
perform sexual intercourse with a man who is not their 
lawful husband.23 In the appeal case of Zainab binti 
Abdul Rahman lwn Pendakwa Syarie Negeri Sembilan, 
the appellant was found to cohabit with a Muslim man 
named Mustafa bin Abdul Aziz on 21 September 1993 
at a house in the state of Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia. 
The appellant was found guilty and ordered to serve ten 
months imprisonment. On appeal the punishment was 
reduced to two months imprisonment along with a fine 
of RM2,000.00.
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Besides that, the fact that a woman is pregnant out 
of wedlock as a result of sexual intercourse performed 
with her consent while she is fully conscious is also 
considered an offence.24
On the other hand, under section 27 of the Syariah 
Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997, ‘any 
man who is found together with one or more women, not 
being his wife;’ or any ‘woman who is found together 
with one or more men not being her husband,’ in any 
secluded place or in a house or room under circumstances 
which may give rise to suspicion that they were engaged 
in immoral acts (this includes sexual intercourse out of 
wedlock), they shall be guilty and shall on conviction 
be liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit, 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or 
both.25
By factual observation, unmarried Muslim cohabitants 
wanting to claim their rights to relationship property will 
not typically bring the case to the Sharia court. This 
is because they could be found guilty of committing 
Islamic criminal offences. To avoid the criminal 
prosecution, they often evade taking legal action to the 
Sharia court. Besides that, article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution clearly mentions the division between the 
Sharia and civil jurisdictions, and thus, any personal 
law concerning Muslims should be dealt with within 
the Sharia jurisdiction. With respect to their relationship 
property, though cohabitants do not fall under the ambit 
of Islamic matrimonial law within the Sharia system, they 
may elect for their property rights in the civil courts as 
two different individuals.26 Muslim cohabitants are not 
seen as criminals in the civil court. Although precedents 
do not exist for such cases involving Muslim cohabitants 
in the civil courts, nevertheless, regarding the division 
of their relationship property, the equitable principle of 
constructive trusts could be applied. The parties may 
contest their rights over the property only to the extent 
of the monetary contribution in the acquisition of the 
property. They could bring the case to the civil court as 
two different individuals (and not as married couples or 
intimately involved unmarried cohabiting couple).27
Unmarried Muslim cohabitants clearly have no 
legal rights to division of property in the event of a 
relationship breakdown, compared to married couples 
who are somewhat protected by the matrimonial laws 
applicable for Muslims, specifically under the Islamic 
Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984. As a 
consequence, unmarried cohabitants have no right or 
capacity to bring an action or to appear in court in the 
event of a relationship breakdown. Noteworthy of the 
crux of this matter, there is an absence of equality between 
the relationships, specifically between the marriage and 
unmarried cohabitation.
The following shall examine the position of non-
Muslim cohabitants to relationship property.
COHABITATION AMONG THE NON-MUSLIMS
Foremost, unmarried cohabitation among Malaysian 
non-Muslims is not a criminal offence. However, the 
Malaysian courts do not treat unmarried cohabitants 
equally to married spouses. The Law Reform (Marriage 
and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA 1976) is not extended 
to unmarried cohabitants. Cases involving unmarried 
cohabitants are mostly dealt with by applying the 
principles of constructive and/or resulting trusts.
In the case of Sivanes A/L Rajaratnam v Usha Rani 
A/P Subramaniam,28 (obiter dictum) the court mentioned 
that:
“In this country, the courts should not treat such a relationship 
in Dennis v McDonald29 as a ‘matrimonial relationship.’ There 
must be a valid marriage under Malaysian law applicable to 
a couple before there can be any matrimonial relationship. In 
this country, a person is either married or not married. There 
is nothing in between…. The principle in Dennis v McDonald 
should not be applied to unmarried couples in Malaysia. The 
terms ‘matrimonial property,’ ‘matrimonial home,’ ‘conjugal 
rights,’ ‘matrimonial proceedings’ or ‘division of matrimonial 
assets’ are terms exclusively for lawfully married couples.”
To illustrate further the situation of non-Muslim 
cohabitants in Malaysia, the case of Loo Cheng Suan 
Sabrina v Khoo Oon Jin Eugene30 is discussed. The 
plaintiff was the registered proprietress of a property, 
which was purchased by the defendant in the plaintiff’s 
name, in 1971. The plaintiff alleged that the property was 
a gift from the defendant because he had wanted her to 
be his mistress since he was then already married. The 
defendant paid the full purchase price of the property 
in 1972, and when his marriage broke down, he moved 
into the property to live there with the plaintiff and their 
infant daughter, Karen. The defendant alleged that the 
plaintiff and he were married under the Chinese rites 
in 1973, but the plaintiff denied this. The plaintiff and 
defendant ceased to live together from April 1975 and 
the plaintiff left the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff 
claimed vacant possession of the property, rent and 
costs and relied on the presumption of advancement. 
The defendant counterclaimed, filed on January 1993 
for a declaration that the plaintiff held the property on a 
resulting trust for him and contended that it was never 
meant as a gift to her.
On the balance of probabilities, the judge held that 
the defendant had acquired the property with the intention 
of using it as a matrimonial home, in which both he and 
plaintiff had equal undivided shares rather than as an 
outright gift to the plaintiff. The evidence showed that at 
the time of registration of the property in the plaintiff’s 
name, it was the understanding of both parties that the 
property was to be a matrimonial home, in which both 
of them were to be equal co-owners.
Although the presumption of advancement arose 
because the defendant had provided the funds for the 
purchase of the property and had registered it in the 
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plaintiff’s name, the defendant had succeeded in rebutting 
the presumption of advancement since, inter alia, at all 
material times he had dealt with the property as he wished 
with the acquiescence of the plaintiff.
Where an association similar to a matrimonial 
relationship breaks down and one party is excluded from 
the family home by the other, a tenant in common is not 
liable to pay an occupation rent merely by virtue of being 
the sole occupant, but the court may order the occupying 
party to pay an occupation rent to the excluded party if it 
is equitable. However, when a spouse, legal or de facto, 
who is a tenant in common or co-owner of a matrimonial 
home is in a position to enjoy his or her right to occupy 
but chooses not to do so voluntarily, then the other party 
who is in occupation is entitled to do so without paying 
an occupation rent. In this case, the plaintiff had left the 
property voluntarily and it would be highly inequitable to 
order the defendant to quit and/or pay an occupation rent 
unless and until their marriage was legally annulled.
The plaintiff was ordered to transfer half of an 
undivided share of the property to the defendant. In giving 
the order, the judge, accepted the following factors:
1. it was evidenced that at the time when the property 
was purchased, the defendant’s marriage with his 
first wife was already on the rocks, and the latter was 
then about to leave to England with their children;
2. around that time, the plaintiff became so intimate 
with the defendant, shortly thereafter she became 
pregnant with the defendant’s child;
3. the court believed that a marriage ceremony 
according to the Chinese rites was carried out 
(although the plaintiff denied this);
4. the plaintiff herself had admitted that her mother and 
she had treated the defendant as her husband; and
5. the more than ample documentary evidence in 
the agreed bundle that the plaintiff was variously 
addressed and known as Mrs Eugene Khoo, or 
Mrs Khoo, and had sent several birthday cards 
to the defendant signing off with expressions of 
endearment, such as ‘from your dearest wife.’ Such 
uncontroverted evidence would also lead the court to 
hold that at the time of registration of the transfer into 
her name, it was the understanding of both parties 
that the said property was to be a matrimonial home 
in which both of them were to be equal co-owners. 
The judge stated that: 
“where the relationship between the parties is close, eg., married 
couples or unmarried couples intending to be married, then in 
the event one of them acquires property in the name of the other 
and has acted to his or her detriment by making a significant 
contribution to the purchase price in cash or kind, a resulting or 
implied trust is presumed in his or her favour…”31
There are several matters to be highlighted in the 
above case. Among them is that the court considered the 
partners functions within the relationship. Firstly, the 
property was bought in 1971, the plaintiff and defendant 
moved in together in 1972 and the relationship broke 
down in 1975. It was for the duration of three years that 
both the plaintiff and defendant have been living together 
in a common residence. Secondly, it was proved that the 
plaintiff and defendant were sexually intimate and as 
a result, there was a child born out of the relationship. 
Thirdly, the court believed that there was a customary 
marriage consummated by the couple, although the 
plaintiff denied this matter. Fourthly, the defendant 
claimed that the property was purchased for the purpose 
of a matrimonial property, and not a gift as claimed by 
the plaintiff. The reputation and public aspect of the 
relationship was taken into consideration. For example, 
the plaintiff’s mother has treated the defendant as the 
plaintiff’s husband. Besides that, there was documentary 
evidence that the plaintiff was variously addressed and 
known as Mrs Eugene Khoo, or Mrs Khoo, and had sent 
several birthday cards to the defendant signing off with 
expressions of endearment, such as ‘from your dearest 
wife.’ The court had considered these functions and 
accepted that the property contested was matrimonial 
property, and thus both parties had equal rights over 
the property. The court treated this couple as similar 
to married couples. Even though this matter was not 
literally stated in the judgment of the court, nor the court 
applied the provisions embedded within the LRA 1976, the 
judge inferred the parties’ common intention to share the 
beneficial ownership of the property. Subsequently, the 
property was accepted for the purpose of a matrimonial 
home. To reiterate, although the LRA 1976 was not 
extended to this couple (in the absence of marriage), 
the court nonetheless decided that the property should 
be equally divided between the parties, based on the 
principles of constructive trusts.
he Court’s decision to grant equal division of the 
matrimonial property demonstrates the similarity of 
decision if the couple were married. This decision would 
have been comparable if the LRA 1976 was applied.32 
Within the LRA 1976, it is stated that the court shall 
have the power to order the division of assets between 
the parties, for the properties that were acquired by the 
spouses’ joint efforts. With respect to this matter, the court 
shall have regard to the extent of contributions made by 
each party in money, property or work towards acquiring 
those assets, any debts owing by each party that were 
contracted for their joint benefit and the need of the minor 
children, and subject to those considerations, the court 
shall incline towards an equality of property division. In 
a circumstance where the property was acquired by the 
sole effort of one of the parties to the marriage, the court 
shall have regard to the extent of contributions made by 
each party to the welfare of the family, by looking after 
the home or caring for the family. However, in any case, 
the party by whom the property was solely acquired shall 
receive a greater property share. Besides the legislation, 
based on the case law for married non-Muslim couples, 
it is apparent that when the property was acquired by the 
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sole effort of one of the parties to the marriage, that party 
receives a greater share out of the property.33 However, 
there is also a case whereby, without the monetary 
contribution the court granted equal rights over the 
matrimonial property.34 This is due to the consideration 
given to the contribution in the form of taking care of 
the family and children. Apart from that, the title of the 
property, which is commonly shared by both spouses, 
is also given importance. The name on the title of the 
property signifies the intention of the couple to acquire, 
possess and/or share the property.35
In Loo Cheng Suan Sabrina,36 the property was 
acquired by the sole effort of the defendant. However 
the title to the property was in the plaintiff’s name. If 
this couple in the current case had been married, the 
provision contained in the LRA 1976 would be applicable. 
In considering (1) the financial contribution of the 
defendant in acquiring the property, (2) the needs of the 
child, (3) the name on the title of the property, (4) the 
(non-monetary) contributions of the plaintiff, by way 
of home making and taking care of the child, the court 
would probably order an equal division of the asset. 
Notwithstanding that, the LRA 1976 was not extended to 
this couple because of the absence of a legally recognised 
marriage. Therefore, the court applied the common law 
principles of constructive trusts. The court gave extensive 
consideration to the couples’ functions and contributions 
to the property and relationship. Subsequently, the court 
granted an equal share for both partners. This matter 
illustrates the court’s decision in treating cohabitants 
as similar to married couples, for the legal purpose of 
relationship property division.
The Malaysian Court of Appeal in Heng Gek Kiau 
v Goh Koon Suan,37 overruled the High Court and 
extended the presumption of advancement from a man 
to his mistress on the ground that ‘principles of equity 
are not etched in stone tablets, inflexible and impervious 
to the passage of time and modernity.’38 Goh owned a 
construction and realty company, hardware shop, factory 
and jewellery shop in Singapore and met Heng when she 
was an Indonesian illegal immigrant. He bought a house 
for RM61,1000 under Heng’s name in the state of Johor, 
Malaysia, so that he could meet her there in intimacy. He 
also misled her into believing that he was single. Several 
years later when the relationship took a wrong turn, she 
claimed that the house was a gift to her; he counterclaimed 
that he was the beneficial owner under a resulting trust.
This was a case of the appellant who lived for 20 
years with the respondent (Goh) and had a son by him. 
He bought a house in her name, which he then claimed 
belonged to him, and never intended it as a gift to her. 
Abdul Malik Ishak J in the High Court held that “there 
was unshaken evidence in the absence of any inherent 
improbability that he had provided the full purchase price 
for the property, registered it under her name and that she 
held it on trust for him.”
On appeal, Gopal Sri Ram J said that the High Court 
adopted the wrong approach, and he reversed the High 
Court decision, basing his judgment on two grounds. He 
held that ‘there was clearly a want of judicial appreciation 
of the evidence by the trial court thereby warranting 
appellate intervention.’ The trial judge had failed to 
appreciate the salient facts that were indicative of a 
donative intention on the part of the man, thus rebutting 
the presumption of a resulting trust in his favour. The 
second ground for allowing the appeal was by extending 
the presumption of advancement from a man to his 
mistress. He also quoted; 
“[Y]ou squeezed her like a lemon and later cast her aside 
like an old shoe. Surely, you cannot use her like that and 
later claim she has no right… the court would not allow such 
injustice to go unnoticed, not in this court…. As mistress 
to Goh, Heng was entitled to the property… the principles 
of equity are not cast in stone and they change according to 
circumstances of a contemporary society … and that women 
in Heng’s position would have no rights if the law remained 
static… It was inappropriate to treat women as chattel as it was 
in a case in England in 185839 where women had no right to 
own property or rights in society and the court ruled that there 
was no presumption of advancement in favour of mistress …
but it would be retrogressive step if the court applied similar 
principle…”40
The Court of Appeal’s judgment can be rationalised 
as an instrument of social engineering to provide an 
element of relief to mistresses given the increasing 
rate of cohabitation in modern society,41 and it ruled as 
a landmark case that mistresses have rights in equity. 
Although the term ‘mistress’ was used in this case, 
the principles developed in the judge’s response to 
cohabitation are beneficial to address the movement to 
recognise cohabiting relationships within the Malaysian 
civil court.
In contrast to the above-mentioned cases,42 the case 
of Liew Choy Hung v Fork Kian Seng43 is an example 
illustrating a situation whereby cohabitants were treated 
as two different individuals in the context of acquiring 
rights to relationship property. The court found ways 
using devices such as constructive trust to divide the 
property of cohabitants.44 In this case, it fell on the court 
to decide on the proportions of the beneficial interests of a 
man and woman in the ownership of the house, which they 
had acquired in their joint names. Neither were married 
to each other but had lived together as cohabitants. The 
plaintiff and the defendant bought a house jointly with 
the aid of a housing loan for which both were liable for 
repayment. The plaintiff and defendant were registered 
as joint proprietors. The plaintiff later repaid the balance 
of the outstanding loan to the bank. However, there was 
no agreement or any transfer document indicating their 
beneficial interest towards the property.
Later, the relationship of the parties broke down. The 
plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to the property as 
she had substantially paid for it. The defendant, on the 
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other hand, claimed that he had bought the plaintiff’s share 
of the property, but he could not prove it. He was then 
prepared to accept a share of the property representing his 
contribution towards its purchase. The court had to decide 
on the issue of the proportions of beneficial interests to 
both parties. It was held that the defendant should transfer 
his share to the plaintiff for RM34,000 and declare that the 
plaintiff is entitled to the whole of the beneficial interests 
in the property. The court mentioned:
1. If two persons purchased property in their joint names 
and there was no declaration of trusts on which they 
were to hold the property, they held the property on 
a resulting trust for each other, proportionate to their 
contributions to the purchase price. 
2. On the facts, the contributions towards the purchase 
price meant that the parties are presumed by operation 
of law to hold the property in this proportion – the 
plaintiff a 91.5 per cent share and the defendant a 
8.5 per cent share in the property. Both parties had 
agreed for the plaintiff to take over the defendant’s 
8.5 per cent share of the property for RM34,000.
In this case, the parties did not attempt to prove 
their relationship (whether similar to marriage), or their 
functionality within the relationship. They represented 
themselves as two different individuals, and the court 
viewed the relationship in the same way. The matter 
before the court was only to quantify the proportions 
of the beneficial interest that both parties acquired in 
the property, which they purchased in their joint names, 
and contributed to the purchase price differently. This 
scenario differs to the previous case of Loo Cheng Suan 
Sabrina v Khoo Oon Jin Eugene,45 whereby the court was 
directed to look at the relationship of the couple, whether 
they perform the same function as married couples, or at 
least whether they quantify their rights to the property as 
married spouses.
Since the Malaysian legislation does not commonly 
recognise the rights of cohabitants towards relationship 
property, the case of Liew Choy Hung v Fork Kian Seng46 
was considered as between two different individuals (not 
married or intimately involved unmarried couple) who 
have jointly purchased a property. The court only took 
into account the parties’ individual monetary contribution 
to the purchase of the property. The party who financially 
contributed more than the other party received a greater 
share. When the property is purchased in the couple’s 
joint names and there is no declaration of trusts on whom 
to hold the property, it should be based on a constructive 
trust. The property was divided in accordance with 
the proportion of their contributions to the purchase 
price. To reiterate, the party who made more financial 
contributions in the acquisition of the property received 
a greater share than the other party who made less of 
a financial contribution. The plaintiff in this case who 
clearly contributed more to the purchase price had greater 
entitlement to the property.
The first case highlighted above, Loo Cheng Suan 
Sabrina v Khoo Oon Jun Eugene,47 is between unmarried 
cohabitants who were functionally the same as married 
couples and the court divided the relationship property 
equally among them. The instant case did not concern 
the partners’ functionality within the relationship and the 
court treated the couple as two different individuals. The 
property was divided in accordance with the monetary 
contribution in the acquisition of the property. The 
following case observes a different scenario, whereby 
one of the partners to the relationship bought a property 
during the cohabitation period, and eventually the couple 
got married in the course of the relationship. The court 
treated the couple on an equal basis. This could be 
for the reason that the couple eventually got married. 
However, if at all the marriage was not consummated, it 
is questionable whether the court would have reached a 
similar decision.
In the case of Wong Kim Foong (F) v Teau Ah Kau 
@ Chong Kwong Fatt,48 the petitioner Wong Kim Foong 
(F) was lawfully married to the respondent, Teau Ah Kau, 
in April 1979. Before their marriage, like most modern 
Chinese couples, they cohabited. They cohabited at ‘the 
Tasek house’ that was purchased in June 1977 in their 
joint names for RM58,500.00. The house was bought 
during the cohabitation period. In the petition, the wife 
described that both she and her husband had contributed 
RM8000.00 each (both contributed the same amount). The 
balance was paid from a bank loan. The house was later 
sold in November 1993, but the petitioner testified that 
she did not get a percentage out of the proceeds of the 
sale for the amount of RM230,000.00. Later, in October 
1991, they jointly purchased another house, ‘the Johor 
house.’ They were married at this time. In the divorce 
petition, the court held that the wife should receive equal 
shares of both houses.
It was argued by the respondent that the proceeds 
of the sale of these two properties should be distributed 
according to the ratio of the monetary contributions of 
both parties. Since both the petitioner and the respondent 
operated separate bank accounts, each having their own 
earnings and each paying income tax separately, then 
they must have intended that the ‘Tasek’ and ‘Johor 
Jaya’ houses be distributed proportionately to their 
contributions therein.
Abdul Malik Ishak J highlighted the best approach 
to consider the division of the ‘Tasek’ and ‘Johor Jaya’ 
houses. Firstly, to ascertain whether these houses were 
acquired during the marriage, and secondly, whether 
these two houses were acquired by the joint efforts of the 
parties to the marriage, or by the sole effort of one of the 
parties. Having found these facts, the third step would be 
to turn to the considerations laid down in section 76 (2)49 
or 76 (4)50 of the LRA 1976. In summary, the courts must 
incline and be responsive to the concept of equality of 
division. The court applied LRA 1976 because the plaintiff 
and defendant did not merely separate as unmarried 
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cohabitants, but eventually got married. Clearly LRA 1976 
applies to married non-Muslim couples and not extended 
for unmarried cohabitants.
The Judge stipulated that although the ‘Tasek’ house 
was acquired before the marriage (during cohabitation), 
while the ‘Johor Jaya’ house was acquired after the 
marriage, both spouses had made financial contribution 
to these two houses. The petitioner testified that, “for the 
past 16 years of the relationship duration, she performed 
dutifully the household duties.” “She did marketing, 
cooking, taking care of their son and almost everything 
else in the ‘Johor Jaya’ house.” The Judge found the wife’s 
role of paying for marketing and household expenses and 
over the years of contributions is substantial to the case. 
Her non-financial contribution to the family was taken 
into consideration.
The court viewed the case as a dispute between 
husband and wife and the court must lean in favour of 
equality of division. In short, the petitioner’s contribution 
to the welfare of the family is also relevant in determining 
the division of the property, and that the two houses were 
in both their joint names. “Therefore, it would be best 
that these properties should be divided in equal shares 
between the parties.”
Thus, in Wong,51 despite the fact that the house was 
bought during the cohabitation period of the parties, the 
court decided that it should be divided equally, since (1) 
the house was in their joint names on the title, and (2) 
they were functionally the same as if they were married, 
at the time of purchasing the ‘Tasek’ house. The petitioner 
was ordered an equal share because both eventually got 
married and legally considered as husband and wife. The 
court considered the wife’s financial and non-financial 
contribution to the family. However, if at all both were 
not married in this case, the judgment would have been 
different.52 If the couple merely cohabited, the non-
financial contribution of the wife is not recognised. 
The property will then be divided only in accordance 
to their financial contribution in the acquisition of the 
matrimonial property. This matter is apparent from the 
third case law discussed above, Liew Choy Hung v Fork 
Kian Seng.53
Wong Fong Yin & Anor v Wong Choi Lin & Anor 
and another suit,54 illustrates a new case law whereby the 
court accepted a couple’s relationship as equivalent to a 
marital union. Their functionality within the relationship 
was taken into consideration;
1. The parties displayed a common intention to live 
together in which they have cohabited for a period 
of 29 years and there were arrangements of financial 
affairs; 
2. The court held that there was a common law marriage 
between the defendant and the deceased, given the 
fact that they cohabited for a considerable length of 
time accompanied by the repute and presumption of 
marriage;
3. They cohabited, holding themselves out as husband 
and wife;
4. They started a family with the birth of their daughter, 
Isabelle;
5. The deceased opened and maintained joint accounts, 
and;
6. The deceased, took out insurance policies naming 
the defendant and Isabelle as beneficiaries. 
Although this case involves a situation that 
challenges the status of a relationship, the court showed 
an acceptance to the couple’s relationship as a common 
law marriage; given the fact that they cohabited for a 
considerable length of time accompanied by repute and 
the presumption of marriage.55
By comparing unmarried cohabitants to married 
couples, the former undergo ambiguities in the laws 
applicable to them, specifically the application of the 
principle of constructive trusts (the difference between 
the cases discussed above). Married couples on the other 
hand possess clearly specified matrimonial rights under 
the statutory law. These rights are guaranteed under the 
Law Reform Act 1976, for non-Muslim married couples 
and Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984 
for married Muslims.56
The distinction in the legal arena treating married 
couples and cohabiting partners differently is based on 
the general principle to recognise and value the status 
of marriage. Although cohabitants are functionally the 
same as married couples, nevertheless, the Malaysian law 
does not provide a specific statutory acknowledgement to 
partners within this relationship. Cohabitants in Malaysia 
are therefore not treated equal to married couples, and 
thus, being denied their basic rights to relationship 
property.
COHABITATION AMONG INTER-RELIGIOUS COUPLES 
(INVOLVING A MUSLIM AND A NON-MUSLIM)
Malaysian law does not permit the registration of 
inter-religious marriage between a Muslim and a non-
Muslim.57 This situation affects partners where one is a 
Muslim and the other is a non-Muslim. To reiterate, the 
Sharia laws govern Muslims, while marriage and other 
family matters for the non-Muslims are governed by the 
civil laws, exclusively under the Law Reform (Marriage 
and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA 1976). There are no legal 
provisions under either the Sharia law or civil law for 
inter-faith partners to consummate marriage. Under the 
Sharia principles, marriages can only be consummated 
for partners who are Muslims, while the LRA 1976 
specifies that marriages valid under the Act are only for 
non-Muslims, and the Act does not apply for Muslims.58 
Under the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 
1984, “no man shall marry a non-Muslim and/or no 
woman shall marry a non-Muslim.”59 A marriage that 
is in contravention of this Act shall not be registrable 
under the Act.60
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Without specific laws or regulation to formalise 
and validate the inter-religious marriage, partners of 
different faiths (involving a Muslim and non-Muslim) 
are not able to legalise their relationship. Therefore, with 
limited choice, these couples would cohabit without being 
married. From factual observation, some inter-religious 
couples elect to customarily marry and cohabit without 
conferring any legal rights to their relationship (or the 
non-Muslim partner converts to Islam in order to marry 
the Muslim partner, and it is not common for the vice-
versa, as a Muslim is not allowed to apostate out from his 
or her religion to marry a non-Muslim partner.61
Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution mentions 
that the Sharia court only has the jurisdiction over Muslims 
and personal law of Muslims, while the civil court applies 
to non-Muslims. In the circumstance where the couple 
are from the two different jurisdictions engaged in one 
relationship, there is no law to recognise the relationship. 
The only available provision for inter-religious couples is 
within section 51 of the LRA 1976, which provides certain 
rights for the non-Muslim spouse against the converted 
spouse who would then be overlooked by the Sharia 
jurisdiction.62 Apart from this section, there is no other 
availability within the statutory law for inter-religious 
couples to unite in a legally recognised relationship. 
Consequently, inter-faith partners would not be able to 
legalise their relationship, and thus, would most probably 
remain as unmarried cohabitants without bestowing any 
legal rights. For the context of relationship property, 
they could apply for the division of property within the 
civil court, and perhaps the couple would be treated as 
two different individuals. Therefore, the property would 
most likely be divided in accordance with the couple’s 
financial contributions towards the property.
Notwithstanding that, for inter-religious couples who 
are both non-Muslims, for example, one of them could 
be Christian, while the other partner may be practising 
Buddhism; they are protected by the LRA 1976, which 
applies to non-Muslims. LRA 1976 applies to almost all 
non-Muslims, irrespective of their distinctive religion. 
Hence, the couple that falls under this category could 
commence marriage and the LRA 1976 would apply.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
There are clear differences within the laws applicable 
for unmarried Muslims, unmarried non-Muslims and 
cohabitants who are inter-religious, specifically, when 
one of the partners is a Muslim whilst the other is a non-
Muslim. With respect to the first category, cohabitation 
among Muslims is considered a criminal offence in the 
Sharia court, and thus, deprived of any legal redress to 
matrimonial property claims. A legal precedent is yet to be 
seen in the Sharia court in matters concerning unmarried 
cohabitants claiming their rights to relationship property. 
This paper does not intend to discuss the decriminalisation 
of Muslims who commit unmarried cohabitation. This 
article discusses the legal position and consequences of 
Muslims from a general viewpoint should they engage 
in unmarried cohabiting relationships.
In contrast, unmarried cohabitation is not a criminal 
offence for the non-Muslims. However, there is no 
specific legislation to recognise or govern the matter 
arising out of this relationship, particularly concerning 
the division of relationship property. The civil courts 
apply the principle of constructive trusts. The parties 
who have contributed to the purchase price, mostly have 
undisputable legal rights over the property contested. 
The party who has not made any monetary contribution 
does not have a quorum in demanding property division. 
Although the court recognises the functionality of 
cohabitants within the relationship, hence, accept the 
relationship; the party by whose sole effort the property 
was acquired receives a greater share than the party who 
has not made any financial contribution. This principle is 
similar to the position of married couples, whereby, those 
spouses who have made more of a financial contribution 
in the acquisition of the matrimonial property receives a 
greater share than the other party who merely contributes 
in taking care of the home and children (non-monetary 
contributions).
If the cohabiting partners could prove their 
functionality towards the relationship, the court would 
acknowledge that matter and order equal property 
division. If the functionality is not proven, the cohabiting 
partners would be treated as two different individuals 
and the court decides in accordance of the beneficial 
interest that the parties acquire in the property. This 
matter is contrary to married couples, whereby, without 
any financial contributions, married spouses could 
still be able to receive a share, of at least one-third or 
one-quarter in the matrimonial property (depending on 
the court’s discretion). Subsequently, it is well defined 
that the principle of equality is absent between these 
relationships; married and unmarried cohabitants in 
Malaysia. The former are somewhat protected, although 
not necessarily achieving equal division, and the latter 
continue to struggle without a clear guideline, due to the 
court’s wide discretionary power and the absence of a 
statutory legislation.
For the inter-religious cohabitants, it is a criminal 
offence to cohabit, especially when one of the partners to 
the relationship is a Muslim. However, they could apply 
for an order for relationship property division in the civil 
court, as two different individuals, hence the court would 
decide the division of the property on the basis of each 
of the partners’ financial contribution in the attainment 
of the property.
This paper focuses and suggests the following 
recommendations for the context of non-Muslims within 
the civil jurisdiction and does not suggest for Islamic law 
and/or de-criminalisation of those offences involving 
unmarried Muslim cohabitants.
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First and foremost, statutory interventions within 
the LRA 1976 to recognise unmarried cohabitants is 
possible. The Act could be amended to define cohabitants 
and set the principles to guide the court in assessing the 
couple’s functionality within the relationship. Further, 
the judges could adopt an open and pro-active approach 
to recognise cohabitants and their functionality within 
the relationship akin to marriage, and the importance of 
equal property division for the property acquired together 
during the course of the relationship. Although the 
courts are beginning to recognise the rights of unmarried 
cohabitants, rights stipulated within the legislation would 
encourage a legal recognition of the relationship and 
provide for clearer guidelines to the court to assess those 
relationships. The purpose of a legislative recognition 
would acknowledge cohabiting relationships as equal 
to married relationships with respect to the distribution 
of relationship property. This would mean that upon a 
relationship breakdown, the cohabiting partners would 
be allocated their share of the property as similar to 
the statutory provisions that apply to married couples. 
Subsequently, consistent judicial outcomes could 
be foreseen for both married couples and unmarried 
cohabiting partners.
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When the marriage takes place, it might be very different if there 
was no marriage at all. If the marriage never took place, the whole 
thing might have to be cancelled. There would probably in those 
circumstances be a resulting trust in the proportions in which 
they contributed. When the marriage takes place as contemplated, 
however, I am satisfied that the moneys stand in the same position 
as moneys contributed after the marriage…”
53 Liew Choy Hung v Fork Kian Seng [2000] 1 MLJ 635.
54 Wong Fong Yin & Anor v Wong Choi Lin & Anor and another suit 
[2013] 4 MLJ 82.
55 Wong Fong Yin & Anor v Wong Choi Lin & Anor and another suit 
[2013] 4 MLJ 82, p. 31.
56 Without any financial contribution in the acquisition of matrimonial 
property, married couples could still be able to obtain a one-third 
share. Cohabitants on the other hand, would not be able to prove 
their beneficial interest within the property. The cohabiting partner 
who merely contributes none on the financial perspective, however, 
contributed in the welfare of taking care of the home and family, 
would probably be denied his or her right to the relationship 
property. 
57 Mitsunari Ayumi, Translation, History and Arts New Horizons in 
Asian Interdisciplinary Humanities Research, eds by Meng JI and 
UKAI Atsuko, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 143.
58 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s 3(3): This Act 
shall not apply to a Muslim or any person who is married under 
Islamic law and no marriage of one of the parties which professes 
the religion of Islam shall be solemnized or registered under this 
Act.
59 Section 10 Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984.
60 Section 12 Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984.
61 The offence of apostasy generally falls under the offence that 
relates to ‘insulting, or bringing into contempt, etc., the religion of 
Islam: Section 7 Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) 
Act 1997. Recently, the state of Kelantan proposed a ‘hudud’ 
(crimes against God) bill that will allow the state to execute 
anyone accused of Apostasy: Mary Chastain “Malaysia State 
Proposes Bill Issuing Death Penalty for ‘Apostasy’” Breitbart New 
Network (20 March 2015), <http://www.breitbart.com/national-
security/2015/03/20/Malaysia-state-proposes-bill-issuing-death-
penalty-for-apostasy/>.
62 S 51(1) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, where one 
party converted to Islam, the other party who has not so converted 
may petition for divorce, provided that no petition under this section 
shall be presented before the expiration of the period of three months 
from the date of the conversion; s 51(2): the court upon dissolving 
the marriage may make provision for the wife or husband, and for 
the support, care and custody of the children of the marriage, if any, 
and may attach any conditions to the decree of the dissolution as it 
thinks fit.
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